Наука, стратегия и война (Стратегия и история) - Frans P.B. Osinga

one sequence.

34 Ibid., p. 36.

35 Strategic Game of ? and ?, p. 1.

36 The ‘approach’ Boyd takes in this presentation and described here is on p. 4.

37 Ibid., p. 3.

38 Ibid., p. 6.

39 Ibid., pp. 7–9.

40 Ibid., p. 10.

41 Ibid., p. 12.

42 Ibid., p. 14.

43 Ibid., p. 15.

44 Ibid., p. 16. Quotations are presented here as in the presentation.

45 Ibid., p. 17. Erie was Boyd’s former hometown.

46 Ibid., pp. 18–19.

47 Ibid., p. 20.

48 Ibid., p. 21.

49 Ibid., p. 22.

50 Ibid., p. 23.

51 Ibid., p. 24.

52 Ibid., p. 25.

53 Ibid., p. 28.

54 Ibid., p. 29. Italics are mine.

55 Ibid., p. 30.

56 Ibid., p. 33. Italics are mine.

57 Ibid., p. 34.

58 Ibid., p. 35.

59 Ibid., p. 36.

60 Ibid., p. 37.

61 Ibid., p. 46.

62 Ibid., p. 38.

63 Ibid., p. 39.

64 Ibid., pp. 40–3.

65 Ibid., p. 44.

66 Ibid., p. 45.

67 Ibid., p. 46.

68 Ibid., p. 47.

69 Ibid., p. 48.

70 Ibid., p. 49.

71 Ibid., p. 50.

72 Ibid., p. 51.

73 Ibid., p. 54.

74 Ibid., p. 55.

75 Ibid., p. 56.

76 Ibid., p. 57.

77 Ibid., p. 58.

78 Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 70.

79 Ibid., p. 177.

80 Boyd, The Conceptual Spiral, p. 2.

81 Ibid., p. 4.

82 Ibid., p. 5.

83 Ibid., pp. 9–12.

84 Ibid., p. 14. The next section almost literally follows Boyd’s text on p. 14.

85 Ibid., p. 16.

86 Ibid., p. 17.

87 Ibid., p. 18.

88 Ibid., p. 19.

89 Ibid., p. 20.

90 Ibid., p. 21.

91 Ibid., p. 22.

92 Ibid., p. 23.

93 Ibid., p. 24.

94 Ibid., p. 25.

95 Ibid., p. 26, italics are mine.

96 Ibid., p. 27.

97 Ibid., p. 28.

98 Ibid., p. 29.

99 Ibid., p. 30.

100 Ibid., p. 31.

101 Ibid., p. 32.

102 Ibid., p. 33.

103 Ibid., p. 34.

104 Ibid., p. 35.

105 Ibid., p. 36.

106 Ibid., p. 37.

107 Ibid., p. 38.

108 Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of War, John Boyd and American Security, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001, p. 188.

109 Robert Polk, ‘A Critique of the Boyd Theory – Is it Relevant to the Army?’, Defense Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2000, p. 259.

110 Grant T. Hammond, The Essence of Winning and Losing, op. cit., p. 2.

111 Ibid., p. 4.

112 Ibid., p. 5.

 

7 Completing the loop

1 Cited in Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Scientific Inquiry, San Francisco: Chandler Publishing, 1964, p. 303.

2 James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press, 2nd edition, 1980, p. 26.

3 Jay Luvaas, ‘Clausewitz: Fuller and Liddell Hart’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 9 (1986), p. 207.

4 In Introduction to Strategy, London: Preager, 1965, on p. 45 and p. 136 Beaufre for instance states that ‘strategy must be a continuous process of original thinking, based upon hypotheses which must be proved true or false as action proceeds’. Furthermore Beaufre recognizes that initiative and freedom of action are essential (p. 36).

5 John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, Colin Gray, Strategy in the Contemporary World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 338.

6 See for instance Charles C. Moskos and James Burk, ‘The Postmodern Military’, in James Burk, The Military in New Times, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 142–4. Christopher Dandeker notes similar changes, but prefers the term ‘late-modernity’.

7 Christopher Dandeker, ‘A Farewell to Arms? The Military and the Nation-State in a Changing World’, in Moskos and Burk, op. cit., pp. 128.

8 See for instance Andrew Latham, ‘Warfare Transformed: A Braudelian Perspective on the “Revolution in Military Affairs” ’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 8 (2) (June 2002), pp. 231–66; Colin McInnes, Spectator-Sport Warfare, The West and Contemporary Conflict, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002; Zeev Maoz and Azar Gat (eds), War in a Changing World, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001, in particular Edward Luttwak, ‘Blood and Computers: The Crisis of Classic Military Power in Advanced Postindustrialist Societies and the Scope of Technological Remedies’, and Azar Gat, ‘Isolationism, Appeasement, Containment, and Limited War: Western Strategic Policy from the Modern to the “Postmodern” Era’.

9 Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare, London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 2–5. See also Martin Shaw, ‘The Development of “Common-Risk” Society: A Theoretical View’, in Jurgen Kulman and Jean Callaghan (eds), Military and Society in 21st Century Europe, Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, 2000, especially pp. 15–19. He liberally refers to postmodern theorists such as Giddens and Bauman. See also Robert Cooper, The Post-Modern State, London: Demos, The Foreign Policy Centre, 1996 for use of similar typology.

10 Chris Hables Gray, Postmodern War, the New Politics of Conflict, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 21–2. For a critique see Errol A. Henderson and J. David Singer, ‘ “New Wars” and rumours of “New War” ’, International Interactions, 28: 2002, p. 165.

11 Ibid., pp. 38–40

12 Ibid., p. 81.

13 Ken Booth, Meyer Kestnbaum and David Segal, ‘Are Post-Cold War Militaries Postmodern?’, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Spring 2001), pp. 333–4.

14 Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond, London: Penguin, 2000; Colin McInnes (2002), op. cit.

15 Booth, Kestnbaum and Segal, op. cit., p. 335. Emphasis is mine.

16 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (New York: Little Brown & Company, 1993, p. 81.

17 See for instance John Warden, ‘The Enemy as a System’, Airpower Journal, No. 9 (Spring 1995), pp. 40–55.

18 Zalmay M. Khalizad and John P. White (eds), Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information in Warfare, Santa Monica: RAND, 1999.

19 This section is derived from Frans Osinga and Rob de Wijk, ‘The Emergence of the Post-Modern Warform: