Насильственная демократизация. Поддержка оппозиционных движений правительством США - Уилл Ирвин

Peebles, Twilight Warriors, 190–191.

176

Ramananda Sengupta, “The CIA Circus,” 2–3; Peebles, Twilight Warriors, 189, 192.

177

Shultz, The Secret War Against Hanoi, 13.

178

Bruce Riedel, What We Won: Americas Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979–89 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2014), 13–15.

179

Ted Galen Carpenter, U.S. Aid to Anti-Communist Rebels: The “Reagan Doctrine” and Its Pitfalls, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 74, 24 June 1986, доступ 11 августа 2016 г., http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa074.html; Riedel, What We Won, 15.

180

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 57–63, 427, 513–529; Abigail T. Linnington, “Unconventional Warfare in U.S. Foreign Policy: U.S. Support of Insurgencies in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Iraq from 1979–2001,” Doctoral dissertation, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, December 2012, 117–118; James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), 44.

181

Andrew Hartman, “‘The Red Template’: U.S. Policy in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan,” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 3 (June 2002): 475; Linnington, “Unconventional Warfare in U.S. Foreign Policy,” 95.

182

Riedel, What We Won, 25–26.

183

Carter, White House Diary, 380.

184

Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 12.

185

Carter, White House Diary, 273.

186

Scott, Deciding to Intervene, 43.

187

Steven L. Reardon, Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1991 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2012), 409.

188

Andrew Mumford, Proxy Warfare (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013), 73; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 51; Linnington, “Unconventional Warfare in U.S. Foreign Policy,” 103.

189

John Prados, “Notes on the CIA’s Secret War in Afghanistan,” The Journal of American History 89, no. 2 (September 2002): 46; Scott, Deciding to Intervene, 45–46; Riedel, What We Won, x.

190

Carter, White House Diary, 382.

191

Riedel, What We Won, 104.

192

Mumford, Proxy Warfare, 42.

193

Mumford, Proxy Warfare, 72–73; Coll, Ghost Wars, 46.

194

Джерри Шектер, служебная записка сотрудников СНБ Советнику по национальной безопасности Збигневу Бжезинскому «Рабочая группа Специального координационного комитета по Ирану и Афганистану: официальная позиция» // Jerry Schecter, NSC staff memorandum to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, “SCC Working Group on Iran and Afghanistan: Public Posture,” 14 January 1980, 1, Box 1, RG 273, Records of the NSC, Presidential Directives (PD), 1977-81, NARA II.

195

Riedel, What We Won, 112.

196

Директива решений по национальной безопасности 75 «Отношения США с СССР», 17 января 1983 г.// NSDD 75, “U.S. Relations with the USSR,” 17 January 1983, 1, Reagan Presidential Library.

197

Prados, “The Continuing Quandary,” 364.

198

Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, U.S. Army in World War II series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1953), 69.

199

См.: Russell W. Volckmann, We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1954); and Donald D. Blackburn, “War Within a War: The Philippines, 1942–1945,” Conflict 7, no. 2 (1987): 131–32, both of which provide first-hand accounts.

200

Hogan, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, 66–68.

201

Hogan, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, 77.

202

Peter Eisner, “Our Man in Manila,” Smithsonian, September 2017, 48–49.

203

Michael E. Krivdo, “Major Jay D. Vanderpool: Advisor to the Philippine Guerrillas,” Veritas, vol. 9, no. 1, 22.

204

William B. Breuer, Top Secret Tales of World War II (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000), 184.

205

Eisner, “Our Man in Manila,” 184.

206

Volckmann, We Remained, 155.

207

Volckmann, We Remained, 184–197.

208

Volckmann, We Remained, 197.

209

Ray C. Hunt and Bernard Norling, Behind Japanese Lines: An American Guerrilla in the Philippines (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 216; Hogan, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, 90–91.

210

Volckmann, We Remained, 220.

211

Hunt and Norling, Behind Japanese Lines, 215.

212

Bob Stahl, Youre No Good to Me Dead: Behind Japanese Lines in the Philippines (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 192; Hogan, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, 81; Eisner, “Our Man in Manila,” 53.

213

Roger M. Pezzelle, “Military Capabilities and Special Operations in the 1980s,” in Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz, eds. Special Operations in U.S. Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984), 139–140.

214

Roosevelt, The Overseas Targets, 13.

215

Roosevelt, The Overseas Targets,