Доктрина шока - Наоми Кляйн

8

Cha А.Е. Hope and Confusion Mark Iraq's Democracy Lessons // Washington Post. 2003. November 24; Booth W, Chandrasekaran R. Occupation Forces Halting Elections Throughout Iraq.

9

Foote С, Block W., Crane К, Gray S. Economic Policy and Prospects in Iraq // Public Policy Discussion Papers. 2004. May 4. № 04-1. Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 2004. P. 37, www.bosfed.org.

10

Lone S. Iraq: This Election Is a Sham // International Herald Tribune. Paris. 2005. January 28.

11

Al-Sistani's Representatives Threaten Demonstrations, Clashes in Iraq // BBC Monitoring International Reports, report by Lebanese Hezbollah TV Al-Manar. 2004. January 16; El-Magd N.A. U.S. Commander Urges Saddam Holdouts to Surrender // Associated Press. 2004. January 16.

12

Moss М. Iraq's Legal System Staggers Beneath the Weight of War // New York Times. 2006. December 17; Kraul C. War Funding Feud Has Iraqis Uneasy // Los Angeles Times. 2007. April 28.

13

Gordon M.R., Trainor В.Е. Cobra II, pp. 4, 555; Borger J. Knives Come Out for Rumsfeld as the Generals Fight Back // Guardian. London. 2003. March 31.

14

Scahill J. Blackwater: The Rise of the Worlds Most Powerful Mercenary Army. New York: Nation Boob, 2007. P. 199.

15

Maass P. The Way of the Commandos // New York Times. 2005. May 1; Jim Steele Bio // Premiere Speakers Bureau, www.premierespeakers.com; Hirsh M., Barry J. «1he Salvador Option» // Newsweek. 2005. January 8.

16

Email from Cpt. William Ponce // PBS Frontline: The Torture Question. 2003. August, www.pbs. org; White J. Soldiers' «Wish Lists» of Detainee Tactics Cited // Washington Post. 2005. April 19.

17

Об этом рассказала Кристиану Миллеру бригадный генерал Дженис Карпински, командовавшая в то время тюрьмой Абу-Грейб. Wilson S., Chan S. As Insurgency Grew, So Did Prison Abuse // Washington Post. 2004. May 10.

18

На следующее утро Санчес разослал еще одну служебную записку, уточняющую и отчасти смягчающую сказанное в предыдущей; второй документ породил много неясностей относительно того, какие техники можно применять. Sanchez R.S. Memorandum, Subject: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy. 2003. September 14, www.aclu.org.

19

Информация в следующих трех абзацах взята из: No Blood, No Foul: Soldiers' Accounts of Detainee Abuse in Iraq. 2006. July // Human Rights Watch, pp. 6-14, www.hrw.org.

20

No Blood, No Foul: Soldiers* Accounts of Detainee Abuse in Iraq. 2006. July // Human Rights Watch, pp. 26,28.

21

Formica R.P. Article 15-6 Investigation of CJSOTF — AP and 5th SF Group Detention Operations. Finalized on 2004. November 8, рассекречено, www.aclu.org.

22

USMC Alleged Detainee Abuse Cases Since 11 Sep 01, в открытом доступе. 2004. July 8, www.aclu.org.

23

Web Magazine Raises Doubts Over a Symbol of Abu Ghraib // New York Times. 2006. March 14; Интервью с Хаджи Али 29 апреля 2005 года. «Несколько плохих мужчин?» (Few Bad Men?) // PBS Now.

24

Haj Alis Story // PBS Now website, www.pbs.org; Kraul C. War Funding Feud Has Iraqis Uneasy.

25

Leadership Failure: Firsthand Accounts of Torture of Iraqi Detainees by the U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne Division. 2005. September // Human Rights Watch, pp. 9,12, www.hrw.org.

26

The New Iraq? Torture and Ul-Treatment of Detainees in Iraqi Custody. 2005. January // Human Rights Watch, pp. 2,4, www.hrw.org; Graham B. Army Warns Iraqi Forces on Abuse of Detainees // Washington Post. 2005. May 20; Moss M. Iraq's Legal System Staggers Beneath the Weight of War.

27

Maass P. The Way of the Commandos.

28

Интервью с Фланом Найрном 10 января 2005 года // Democracy Now!, www.democracynow. org; Moore S. Killings Linked to Shiite Squads in Iraqi Police Force // Los Angeles Times. 2005. November 29.

29

Moss М. Iraq's Legal System Staggers Beneath the Weight of War; Cambanis T. Confessions Rivet Iraqis // Boston Globe. 2005. March 18; Maass P. The Way of the Commandos.

30

Там же; Burns J.E Torture Alleged at Ministry Site Outside Baghdad // New York Times. 2005. November 16; Moore S. Killings Linked to Shiite Squads in Iraqi Police Force.

31

Collins A. In the Sleep Room: The Story of the CIA Brainwashing Experiments in Canada. Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1988. P. 174.

32

McKew M. Confessions of an American Hawk.

33

Krauthammer Ch. In Baker's Blunder, a Chance for Bush // Washington Post 2006. December 15; Kagan RW. Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq. Phase I Report. 2007. January 4. P. 34, www.aei.org.

34

Jamail D., Al-Fadhily A. Iraq: Schools Crumbling Along with Iraqi Society // Inter Press Service. 2006. December 18; Crain Ch. Professor Says Approximately 300 Academics Have Been Assassinated // USA Today. 2005. January 17; O'Hanlon M.E., Campbell J.H. Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq. 2007. February 22 // Brookings Institution. P. 35, www.brookings.edu; Redmond R. Iraq Displacement. 2006. November 3. Press briefing, Geneva, www.unhcr.org; Iraq's Refugees Must Be Saved from Disaster // Financial Times. London. 2007. April 19.

35

Nearly 20000 People Kidnapped in Iraq This Year: Survey // Agence France-Presse. 2006. April 19; The New Iraq? // Human Rights Watch, pp. 32, 54, www.hrw.org.

36

Первоначально предполагалось, что банк HSBC откроет свои отделения по всему Ираку. Вместо этого он приобрел долю в 79 процентов в иракском банке «Дар Эс-Салам». Broder J.M., Risen J. Contractor Deaths in Iraq Soar to Record // New York Times. 2007. May 19; Richter P. New Iraq Not Tempting to Corporations // Los Angeles Times. 2004. July 1; Dreazen Y.J. An Iraqis Western Dream // Wall Street Journal. 2005. March 14; Syria and Iraq: Unbanked and Unstable // Euromoney. 2006. September; Cha A.E.t Spinner J. U.S. Companies Put Little Capital into Iraq // Washington Post. 2004. May 15.

37

Mosher A., Witte G. Much Undone in Rebuilding Iraq, Audit Says // Washington Post. 2006. August 2; Borger J. Brutal Killing of Americans in Iraq Raises Questions over Security Firms // Guardian. London. 2004. April 2; Review of Administrative Task Orders for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts. 2006. October 23 // Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, p. 11, www.sigir.mil.

38

Witte G. Despite Billions Spent, Rebuilding Incomplete.

39

Hussein A.y Freeman С US to Reopen Iraq's Factories in $ 10m U-turn // Sunday Telegraph. London. 2007. January 29.

40

White /., Witte G. To Stem Iraqi Violence, U.S. Looks to Factories // Washington Post. 2006. December 12.

41

Baker J.A. III Hamilton L.H., Eagleburger L.S., et al. Iraq Study Group Report. 2006. December. P. 57, www.usip.org.

42

Pfeifer S. Where Majors Fear to Tread.

43

Iraq's Refugee Crisis Is Nearing Catastrophe // Financial Times. London. 2007. February 8; Gallu }. Will Iraq's Oil Blessing Become a Curse? // Der Spiegel. 2006. December 22; Fortson D., Murray-Watson A.y Webb T. Future of Iraq: The Spoils of War // Independent. London. 2007. January 7.

44

Iraqi Trade Union Statement on the Oil Law. 2006. December 10-14 // Iraqi Labor Union Leadership, www.carbonweb.org.

45

WongE. Iraqi Cabinet Approves Draft of Oil Law // New York Times. 2007. February 26.

46

Schooner St.L. Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined Outsourced Government // Stanford Law & Policy Review 16. 2005. № 2. P. 552.

47

Scahill }. Blackwater, p. 123.

48

Krane }. A Private Army Grows Around the U.S. Mission in Iraq and Around the World // Associated Press. 2003. October 30; Scahill}. Mercenary Jackpot // The Nation. 2006. August 28; Scahill J. Exile on K Street // The Nation. 2006. February 20; Hemingway M. Warriors for Hire // Weekly Standard. 2006. December 18.

49

Witte G. Contractors Were Poorly Monitored, GAO Says // Washington Post. 2005. April 30.

50

Выгода этой ситуации в том, что контрактники работают под крайне слабым контролем. Как это показало собственное расследование армии США по поводу скандала с Абу-Грейб, правительственные чиновники, которые формально должны были контролировать деятельность дознавателей, находились в другом месте — не только вне стен тюрьмы Абу-Грейб, но и за пределами Ирака, — поэтому им было «крайне сложно, если вообще возможно, эффективно управлять работами по контракту». Генерал армии Джордж Фей, автор отчета, делает вывод, что правительственные «следователи, аналитики и руководители были просто не готовы к появлению ведущих допрос контрактников, их не обучали вопросам управления, контроля и поддержания дисциплины относительно персонала такого рода... Очевидно, что надежной практики адекватного наблюдения за работой по контракту в Абу-Грейб не существовало». Fay G.R. AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, pp. 19,50,52, www4.army.mil.